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I.

INTRODUCTION

In January 2017, Anthony Montwheeler kidnapped his second ex-wife,
attacking her with a knife and fleeing with her in his car. 1 The following
police chase ended in a high-speed collision with another car, and
Montwheeler was finally arrested. 2 His ex-wife and the driver of the other
vehicle were pronounced dead at the scene. 3 However, this was not the
beginning of Montwheeler’s story.
Just over twenty years earlier, in 1996, Oregon courts found Anthony
Montwheeler “guilty except for insanity” for kidnapping his first ex-wife and
ordered Montwheeler subject to state jurisdiction for seventy years. 4 During
his years in custody, Montwheeler benefitted from Oregon’s conditional
release program, which also helped him obtain housing. 5 Eventually,
Montwheeler convinced the state review board that he did not in fact have
mental illness and that he could be released. 6 At the hearing to determine
Rob Fischer, Pleas of Insanity: The Mysterious Case of Anthony Montwheeler, ROLLING
STONE (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/anthonymontwheeler-oregon-murder-annita-harmon-954479/ [https://perma.cc/GDZ3-T6K5].
1

2
3
4
5
6

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Montwheeler’s sanity, the forensic psychologist reviewing Montwheeler’s
file determined that Montwheeler had an increased risk of violence if
released unsupervised. 7 However, the psychiatrist at the state hospital
disagreed based on Montwheeler’s clinical records from the previous two
decades—Montwheeler was released before the completion of his term, just
a month before the events of January 2017. 8 Like other offenders discharged
from the state hospital in Oregon, he was not diverted into the penitentiary. 9
The public has a multitude of fears regarding the insanity defense,
which are clearly presented by the Anthony Montwheeler case: 10 the safety
of the public, the potential for malingering, and the indiscriminate use of
such a defense, among others. 11 Intense media coverage of cases like these
has repeatedly encouraged states to narrow or even do away with their
insanity defenses. 12 The prevalence of these fears are reflected in the
restriction on insanity defense legislation, but these misconceptions are
largely unfounded. 13 For example, a common misconception exists that the
insanity defense is used in a significant portion of trials—this simply is not
true. 14 In fact, the defense is only used in around one percent of criminal
cases, 15 and of that number only one in four is successful. 16 This low number
can be traced to the stringency of insanity defense statutes. 17 While proving

7
8
9
10

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (“Concerns that Montwheeler has repeatedly taken advantage of the system, and may

have the opportunity to do so again, have only been exacerbated by competing explanations
for what went wrong in his case.”).
See id.; Steve Erickson, A Watershed Right to the Insanity Defense, CRIME &
CONSEQUENCES
BLOG
(Sept.
17,
2019),
http://www.crimeandconsequences.com/crimblog/2019/09/a-watershed-right-to-theinsan.html [https://perma.cc/NHH6-WCEJ] (“Any discussion about the insanity defense
invites skeptics who complain about defendants who malinger or flaws within the
formulations of the defense.”); see generally Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The
Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. L. REV. 599, 644
(1989).
See Lawrence Fitch & Susan R. Steinberg, Competency to Stand Trial and Criminal
Responsibility, 36 MD. B.J. 14, 18–19 (2003) (“The rare contested case may generate
significant media attention . . . .”); see generally Louis Kachulis, Insane in the Mens Rea:
Why Insanity Defense Reform is Long Overdue, 26 S. CAL. REV. L & SOC. JUST. 245, 250
(2017).
See generally Perlin, supra note 11.
See Shawn Roberson & Connie Smothermon, Changes to the Insanity Laws: Not Guilty
by Reason of Mental Illness and Guilty with Mental Defect, 87 OKLA. B.J. 2349, 2349 (2016).
11

12

13
14

15

Id.

Fischer, supra note 1.
See, e.g., Ralph Slovenko, Commentary: Personality Disorders and Criminal Law, 37 J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 182, 184–85 (2009) (“[W]hen the NGRI [not guilty by reason of
insanity] plea is urged, even defendants who are floridly psychotic are found guilty, not
NGRI.”).
16
17
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highly contentious over the years, 18 the insanity defense is necessary as a
means of protecting the most vulnerable in our population when they are
no longer able to follow public norms. 19
Those with mental illness still operate with a consistent internal logic
and worldview. 20 However, these constructs within the private mind can fail
to conform to constructs held by society as a whole. 21 A severely mentally ill
individual simply interacts with the world in a different way than someone
without mental illness. 22 The misconception that the mentally ill are
dangerous may have arisen because those with mental illness have more
difficulty conforming their behavior to societal norms. 23
This Note first examines the background of the insanity defense,
including the various tests that have been used in U.S. jurisdictions. Part III
of this Note explores the greatest dangers to the insanity defense, including
public misconceptions of the defense and the impact of stigma. Part III also
investigates the public, legal, and judicial skepticism shown to psychiatrists
and mental health experts. Part III concludes by pointing out the lack of a
system protecting the mentally ill in the United States. This Note then
considers, in Part IV, the potential impact of increased psychological
consideration in the field of law by delving into personality disorders,
specifically exploring the impact of antisocial personality disorder and why
these individuals are excluded from the defense.
Finally, Part V of this Note shows why a profound adjustment to the
current insanity defense jurisprudence is necessary. Part V first considers
the extreme necessity of the insanity defense, then delves into who should
be allowed to use the defense. In determining who should use the defense,
Part V explores the insanity defense requirements as they relate to the
See Fischer, supra note 1.
Angela B. Vickers, The Importance of Mental Illness Education, 52 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 55,
55 (2001) (“Until our legal community—both lawyers and judges—understands basic truths
about the medically based and highly treatable mental illnesses . . . our nation does not offer
‘justice for all’ for the more than 27 million Americans who have one or more of these
common brain problems.”); Sarah Rosenfield, Factors Contributing to the Subjective Quality
of Life of the Chronic Mentally Ill, 33 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 299, 299 (1992) (“The
seriously mentally ill often receive only minimal services in the community.”).
Sam Vaknin, Personality Disorders as an Insanity Defense, HEALTHY PLACE (Oct. 1,
2009), https://www.healthyplace.com/personality-disorders/malignant-self-love/personalitydisorders-as-an-insanity-defense [https://perma.cc/98QD-J66Y] (“All ‘mentally-ill’ people
operate within a (usually coherent) worldview, with consistent internal logic, and rules of right
and wrong (ethics).”).
Id. (“The problem is that these private constructs rarely conform to the way most people
perceive the world.”).
Jennifer S. Bard, Re-Arranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: Why the Incarceration of
18
19

20

21

22

Individuals with Serious Mental Illness Violates Public Health, Ethical, and Constitutional
Principles and Therefore Cannot Be Made Right by Piecemeal Changes to the Insanity
Defense, 5 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 24 (2005).
James F. Hooper, The Insanity Defense: History and Problems, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.

23

REV. 409, 413 (2006).
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personality disorders discussed in Part IV. In using this comparison, this
Note determines the optimal basic elements of the defense and argues this
basis should be required before the individual jurisdictions make their
iterations. Part V concludes with the necessity of education regarding the
insanity defense and mental illness as a whole, along with the requisite
element of community care and access to treatment.
II.

BACKGROUND: THE INSANITY DEFENSE

The insanity defense dates back to ancient Greece and Rome. 24 For
hundreds of years, there existed an understanding that a lack of capacity to
differentiate good from evil, or right from wrong, could relieve responsibility
for a crime. 25 This remained true even as science, medicine, and knowledge
about mental illness expanded in the passing centuries. 26 The core issue for
the insanity defense is the law’s ability to differentiate the “mad” from the
“bad,” and what to do with those individuals. 27 The term “insanity” is a legal
concept and does not refer to the state of psychosis of an individual, but
rather refers to the responsibility of an individual for their actions. 28 The
underlying reasoning is that the law “ought not punish someone who was
incapable of forming good reasons through no fault of [their] own.” 29
The insanity defense is an excuse, admitting the wrongfulness of the
defendant’s action while simultaneously recognizing the actor does not
deserve punishment. 30 Though the tests for insanity have changed
throughout the centuries, and continue to vary to this day, the common
underlying principles remain the same. 31 The defense has historically been
based in morality, which is conceptually derived from the community. 32 In
the common law, the presence of moral understanding and reason are
essential to criminality itself. 33 The community’s criminal law is based upon
T.V. Asokan, The Insanity Defense: Related Issues, 58 INDIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 191, 191
(2016).
Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1030 (2020).
Id. at 1039 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Fischer, supra note 1.
Asokan, supra note 24, at 192.
Erickson, supra note 11 (“A system of justice that convicts someone who is so out of touch
with reality that he cannot reason sensibly is an unjust one. He cannot be guided by the law
because he is insufficiently governed by its reasons.”).
Asokan, supra note 24, at 192 (“Justifications render conduct lawful and so may not be
construed as crime. Excuses render the actor’s otherwise unlawful conduct as not deserving
punishment.”).
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1045 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Even as states experimented with the test,
they retained a common core going all the way back to the “good and evil” test. Id.
Id. at 1047.
Id. at 1040 (“The four preeminent common-law jurists, Bracton, Coke, Hale, and
Blackstone, each linked criminality to the presence of reason, free will, and moral
understanding.”); Erickson, supra note 11 (“The capacity for rationality is a necessity for legal
24

25
26
27
28
29

30

31

32
33
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a collective understanding of what is “right” and what is “wrong.” 34 A
defendant’s capacity to understand right from wrong has historically served
as a test of responsibility. 35 Thus, the traditional insanity test excuses
defendants of their criminal responsibility due to an inability to differentiate
rightfulness and wrongfulness. 36 However, the law strictly limits the
conditions that can be used to mitigate criminal responsibility under the
insanity defense. 37
A series of different insanity tests have evolved over the centuries. Early
tests reflect the roots of the insanity defense—the “good and evil” test, the
“wild beast” test, and the “right and wrong” test—which are all based in
cultural and social understandings of superstition and demonology, not
science. 38 In 1843, the case of Daniel M’Naghten created a new insanity
standard. 39 M’Naghten tried to kill Robert Peel, the United Kingdom’s
Prime Minister, under the psychotic delusion that Peel wanted to kill him. 40
When M’Naghten was found not guilty by reason of insanity, the public
outcry led the House of Lords in Parliament to command that the Lords of
Justice of the Queen’s Bench “fashion a strict definition of criminal
insanity.” 41 They did so, determining that in order to obtain a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity, the individual must have been “labouring under
such a defect of reason, from a disease of the mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did
not know he was doing what was wrong.” 42 The United States initially
adopted the English M’Naghten rule, as with most common law. 43
Four tests evolved across U.S. jurisdictions:
1. The M’Naghten test has two prongs: the first inquires as to
whether the defendant knew what he was doing (cognitive
incapacity); the second inquires as to whether the defendant knew

and moral responsibility, which is why young children and those with profound intellectual
disabilities have long been considered not responsible for their conduct.”).
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1047 (“The tradition [of having a morality component in the insanity
test] reflects the fact that a community’s moral code informs its criminal law.”).
Fitch & Steinberg, supra note 12, at 15.
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1030.
Ronald Schouten, The Insanity Defense: An Intersection of Morality, Public Policy, and
Science,
PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY
(Aug.
16,
2012),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/almost-psychopath/201208/the-insanity-defense
[https://perma.cc/T93Z-U3JT].
Perlin, supra note 11, at 631–32.
L. LIBR. - AM. L. AND LEGAL INFO., M’Naghten Rule, https://law.jrank.org/pages/8620/MNaghten-Rule.html [https://perma.cc/5HCG-6BCB] [hereinafter M’Naghten Rule].
34

35
36
37

38
39

40
41

Id.
Id.

Queen v. M’Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843). Additionally, intoxication has
never qualified for the insanity defense. M’Naghten Rule, supra note 39.
M’Naghten Rule, supra note 39.
42

43

376

2022]

SAVING THE INSANITY DEFENSE

377

what he was doing was wrong (moral incapacity). 44 Seventeen states
use variations of the M’Naghten test. 45 Ten states have a defense
based only on moral incapacity. 46 The federal court system is
governed by the Insanity Defense Reform Act, which uses a stricter
variation of the M’Naghten test. 47
2. The volitional incapacity test (also known as the
“irresistible-impulse” test) determines whether the defendant is
driven to commit the criminal act by an “irresistible impulse”
caused by mental defect. 48 The volitional element to an insanity test
involves whether a delusional compulsion overmastered the
individual’s will. 49
3. The American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code creates
an insanity test with both a volitional incapacity component and a
moral incapacity component. 50 Thirteen states have variants of the
Model Penal Code test. 51
4. The “product” test asks whether the accused crime was the
product of mental disease or defect. 52 The product test is the most
liberal and expansive of the tests and is followed only by New
Hampshire. 53
Each state has the right to choose which insanity test it follows, 54 but
only five states do not have an insanity test questioning the blameworthiness
Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1025 (2020); Id. at 1046 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The
M’Naghten test, though used almost exclusively by American courts for over a century and
44

still in use today, received severe criticism due to its rigidity and inappropriate ignoring of the
volitional components of behavior. Perlin, supra note 11, at 634.
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1046.
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 751 (2006).
Kachulis, supra note 12, at 250; Perlin, supra note 11, at 638–39.
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1046.
Zoom Call Interview with Dr. Adriana Flores, Forensic Psych., Adjunct Assoc. Professor,
Emory Univ. Sch. Med. (Oct 2, 2020) [hereinafter Interview with Dr. Flores].
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1046.
Clark, 548 U.S. at 800.
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1046. The test also looks at the defendant’s morality and impulsivity.
45
46
47
48
49

50
51
52

Id.
Id.; Zoom Call Interview with Dr. Bob Stinson, Forensic Psych., Att’y, Stinson & Assocs.,
53

Inc. (Feb. 4, 2021) [hereinafter Interview with Dr. Stinson].
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1026 n.3. Four states have abolished the insanity test altogether.
Samuel Adjorlolo, Heng Choon (Oliver) Chan & Matt DeLisi, Mentally Disordered
Offenders and the Law: Research Update on the Insanity Defense, 2004–2019, 67 INT’L J.L.
PSYCHIATRY 1 (2019); Bard, supra note 22, at 36 (“Currently, Idaho, Montana, Utah, and
Kansas do not offer an insanity defense.”).
54
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of the defendant. 55 In the 1970s, outrage following the heavily publicized
insanity trial of John Hinckley Jr. led to many states narrowing their insanity
statutes. 56 At that time, most states turned from the American Law Institute’s
test to a more limited version of the M’Naghten test. 57 Now, jurisdictions
predominantly use the cognitive prong, where if an individual understands
essentially what they are doing, they are held responsible for those acts
regardless of whether the acts constitute a product of mental illness or a lack
of volitional control. 58 The basic philosophy exists that an individual who
did not understand what they were doing was wrong should not be held
legally responsible, the reason being that there is little use punishing or trying
to rehabilitate an individual who did not know the wrongfulness of their
actions or who lacked volitional control. 59 Difficulty arises when trying to put
these basic philosophical principles down into law and assessment. 60
Given the allowance for states to create their own insanity
jurisprudence, the test for the defense varies between jurisdictions. 61
Jurisdictions also vary on how they limit expert witnesses in insanity trials. 62
Likewise, the programs for conditional release for the mentally ill after a
finding of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) vary by jurisdiction. 63
Insanity laws do not always contain definitions of mental disease or defect
and also vary considerably between jurisdictions. 64 Despite the jurisdictional
differences, the particular label for the mental illness is not necessarily
relevant in insanity cases; more important considerations are the functional,
cognitive, and moral impairments of the individual. 65
The insanity defense is representative of the fundamental and basic
values held in criminal law, and reflects the community fear, much like the
death penalty, of potential failures in the justice system. 66 These fears relating
See Bard, supra note 22, at 36; Clark, 548 U.S. at 735 (adding Arizona to the list of states
using only a mens rea standard of guilt).
See David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law, 16 L. HUM. BEHAV.
27, 30–31 (1992).
55

56

57

Id.

58

Interview with Dr. Stinson, supra note 53.

59

Id.
Id.

60

Landy F. Sparr, Personality Disorders and Criminal Law: An International Perspective, 37
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 168, 169 (2009).
E.g., Jason R. Smith, Invested with a Strange Authority: A Guide to the Insanity Defense
and Related Issues in Tennessee, 5 LINCOLN MEM’L UNIV. L. REV. 20, 23–24 (2018).
Samuel J. House, Tiffany A. Howell, Jessica Howdeshell, Carrie Jones & Rebecca B.
Spohn, How Effective is Arkansas’ Program that Conditionally Releases Criminal
Defendants Judged Not Guilty by Reason of Mental Disease or Defect?, 53 ARK. LAW. 30,
31 (2018).
Sparr, supra note 61, at 168.
Richard J. Bonnie, Should a Personality Disorder Qualify as a Mental Disease in Insanity
Adjudication?, 38 J.L. MED. ETHICS 760, 760–61 (2010).
Perlin, supra note 11, at 618–19 (“[T]he insanity defense . . . ‘has consistently reflected a
“symbolic perspective” of citizens’ basic values.”).
61

62

63

64
65

66
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to the defense represent the fundamental fears intrinsic to society: the
breaking down of law and order and an ultimate failing of the justice
system. 67 This intrinsic nature of the defense makes changes to insanity
jurisprudence complex and controversial.
III.

THE CRISIS OF A DISAPPEARING INSANITY DEFENSE

Widespread misconceptions about mental illness and the insanity
defense fundamentally impact the insanity doctrine. 68 The insanity test as it
currently exists is more restrictive than it was over 145 years ago at the time
of the M’Naghten verdict. 69 While society knows comprehensively more
now about science and human behavior, the insanity defense has shrunk
unnaturally. 70 The continued narrowing and abolishment of traditional
insanity tests fails to adequately acknowledge the serious impact mental
illnesses can have on individuals and society, and perpetuates the
criminalization of the mentally ill. 71 The concerns of the public regarding
the insanity defense do not negate the fundamental principle that those who
lack responsibility for their actions due to impaired rational capacity are not
deserving of punishment. 72 The mentally ill are a vulnerable population and
should therefore have increased protection.
The lay public holds many incorrect stereotypes about the mentally
ill. 73 These misunderstandings involve risk level, treatability, stability of
symptoms, and more. 74 Mental illness is difficult to conceptualize for the
layperson, creating fundamental misunderstandings. Knowledge gaps make
the role of the experts crucial—they provide the relevant knowledge the
layperson lacks. 75 Crucially compounding the issue, the fields of law and
psychology regard one another with suspicion. 76 The difficulty
67
68

Id. at 621.
Id. at 604 (The myths propagated about mental health are powered by “an omnipresent

fear of feigning, by a community sense that mental illness is somehow different from other
illnesses, by a public need for mentally disabled criminal defendants to conform to certain
typical external manifestations of ‘craziness,’ and by a persistent belief that it is simply
improper to exculpate most criminal defendants because of their mental illness.”).
Id. at 643.
Id. (“A fundamental question that we must ask ourselves as a society is, if we now
understand so much more about science, human behavior, and empiricism than we did at
the time of, say, the M’Naghten verdict, why have we shrunken our insanity defense to the
point where it not only approximates, but is even more restrictive than what was scientifically,
empirically, and morally out of date 145 years ago?”).
Interview with Dr. Stinson, supra note 53.
Erickson, supra note 11 (“A system of justice that convicts someone who is so out of touch
with reality that he cannot reason sensibly is an unjust one. He cannot be guided by the law
because he is insufficiently governed by its reasons.”).
Interview with Dr. Stinson, supra note 53. Stereotypes of mental illness may be due to fear
and emotional reasoning. Id.
69
70

71
72

73

74
75
76

Id.
Id.
See id.
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conceptualizing mental illness can affect the standing of mental health
experts, who have been viewed skeptically by judges and jurors alike. 77
There is no other system protecting those with severe mental illness from
being sent to prison. 78 A more accurate understanding and increased
interdisciplinary work between these two fields—law and psychology—would
contribute to improving the prospects of those with severe mental illness.

A. Public Misconceptions Mischaracterize the Defense
The layperson lacks an accurate understanding of those with mental
illness. 79 All extreme violence seems insane on some level, and this may be
why the insanity test is surrounded by so many myths and general
misunderstandings. 80 There is a common misconception that the insanity
defense functions as an arbitrary get-out-of-jail-free card. 81 In truth, the
defense is so narrow that it excludes most of those who are perhaps
deserving of its use. 82 The insanity defense is also commonly misconstrued
as only being used in conjunction with the most “heinous” and “violent
crimes.” 83 However, this misconception inaccurately conflates mental illness
with violence. When those with severe mental illness are able to remain
symptom-free and do not use drugs and alcohol, they are no more
dangerous than anybody else. 84 An individual with severe mental illness is
not, by definition, a significantly higher risk to their community compared
to a neurotypical individual, 85 and the identification between violent crimes
and mental illness may be propagated mostly by sensationalized media. 86
The system for those adjudicated NGRI is generally misunderstood,
with a great deal of misconception surrounding the topic of release into the
77

Id.

A lack of capacity can temporarily stop an individual from going to trial, but these
individuals are repetitively examined to see if they have the renewed capacity to go to trial.
See Interview with Dr. Flores, supra note 49. Therefore, the insanity defense is the only
excuse a mentally ill defendant can use to escape imprisonment. See id.; infra Part III.B.
Interview with Dr. Stinson, supra note 53.
Fischer, supra note 1.
See id.; Kachulis supra note 12, at 261.
See, e.g., Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 741 (2006). Clark, though indisputably suffering
from paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the shooting, did not meet the requirements of
the insanity defense. See id.
Kachulis, supra note 12, at 252 (“[T]he association of the insanity defense with heinous,
violent crimes means that the public feels like retribution is especially deserved, and that
defendants are gaming the system . . . .”) (footnote omitted).
Interview with Dr. Stinson, supra note 53. Risk of dangerousness is on a continuum; some
individuals will necessarily be more or less dangerous due to individual factors. Id. Risk of
dangerousness increases with use of drugs and/or alcohol and when symptoms remain
uncontrolled. Id.
Id. Risk management precautions can be taken for those at a higher risk but protecting
society from an entire class of individuals due to mental illness makes little sense when
compared to the available research. Id.
See Kachulis, supra note 12, at 254.
78

79
80
81
82

83

84

85

86
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community. 87 Despite the common myth that insanity acquitees spend less
time in custody than defendants convicted of the same offenses, 88 NGRI
defendants actually serve “more time than they would have for a criminal
conviction.” 89 Data shows that NGRI acquitees spend almost double the
time in custody and can “often face a lifetime of post-release judicial
oversight.” 90 For an extremely sick individual who commits homicide, the
best outcome with NGRI is that they are in the hospital for the rest of their
life. 91 That same individual could plead out for thirty years and be released
again. 92 The decision to release those adjudicated NGRI back into the
community is a consideration with many factors and huge potential
consequences. 93 Consequently, many insanity acquitees spend longer in
hospitals while judges determine their risk. 94 Before an individual deemed
NGRI can be discharged on conditional release, they are assessed by
professionals for their risk of dangerousness. 95 That assessment is then given
to the judge who ultimately makes the decision whether or not to release the
individual and set the conditions of their release. 96 Importantly, if a risk of
dangerousness is found in a mentally ill individual, that individual is not
released, and any subsequent release is conditional and monitored. 97
Another common, but false, misconception is that defendants claiming
the insanity defense are malingering, or “faking.” 98 The truth is actually the
opposite: malingering is statistically low and empirical evidence shows
seriously mentally ill defendants will actually feign sanity. 99 Additionally,
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Interview with Dr. Stinson, supra note 53.
See Perlin, supra note 11, at 651.
Bard, supra note 22, at 51; see also Perlin, supra note 11, at 651.
Perlin, supra note 11, at 651.
Interview with Dr. Flores, supra note 49.
Id.
Id.
See D.J. Jaffe, Legal System Still Does a Terrible Job of Handling the Mentally Ill, WALL

ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2010), https://mentalillnesspolicy.org/ngri/not-guilty-reason-insanity.html
[https://perma.cc/CLW3-8HRD]. Insanity acquitees may face longer sentences simply
because judges are not willing to let them out into the community again. See id.; Adjorlolo,
supra note 54, at 7 (“The severity of the index offense significantly predicts the duration of
stay at inpatient facility.”).
Interview with Dr. Flores, supra note 49.
95

Id.
See House, supra note 63, at 31. But see Natalie Jacewicz, Does a Psychopath Who Kills
Get to Use the Insanity Defense?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 3, 2016),

96
97

https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/08/03/486669552 [https://perma.cc/2Q9KTFWZ] [hereinafter Does a Psychopath] (“[F]acilities sometimes make release decisions
based too much on whether patients are currently stable mentally, rather than on long-term
risks they pose.”).
Perlin, supra note 11, at 715–16.
Id. (“Contrary to the prevailing stereotype, malingering among insanity defendants is
statistically low and is fairly easy to discover. In fact, the empirical evidence shows that it is
much more likely that seriously mentally disabled criminal defendants will feign sanity in an
effort to avoid being seen as mentally ill . . . .”) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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public perception that mental health experts tend to disagree among
themselves is perpetuated by the significant media attention garnered by the
unusual and rare contested case. 100 For the vast majority of cases, experts for
both prosecution and defense are in agreement regarding the psychiatric
diagnosis of the defendant. 101
The insanity defense has undergone both substantive and procedural
modifications over the ages, but any parallels toward medical science and
psychological understanding have been accompanied by regression in the
doctrine following unpopular verdicts in highly publicized cases. 102 While
scholars, legislators, and judges acknowledge the need for criminal law to
take psychological and psychiatric learnings into account, sensationalized
trials consistently promote the widespread myths about the insanity
defense. 103 The media feeds into public misconceptions regarding the
insanity defense and the link between mental illness and criminality as a
whole. 104 Highly publicized disputes by experts, such as in the Hinckley trial,
only aid in spreading the myth and public skepticism regarding psychiatrists’
ability to make trustworthy and reasoned judgments in these cases. 105 The
public is thus led to the conclusion that the insanity defense should not be
used, and this impetus encourages lawmakers to narrow the defense. 106
While both law and science value the testing of hypotheses and empirical
results, data relevant to insanity defense jurisprudence is “ultimately
irrelevant to legal decision-makers.” 107 In a very significant way, showing data
to legislatures means nothing because of these persistent publicly held
beliefs that ultimately affect the narrowing of the defense. 108
The public’s misunderstanding of the insanity defense can also
Fitch & Steinberg, supra note 12, at 19 (showing how media attention to contested cases
can lead “to the public perception that mental health experts generally disagree and that
‘insanity’ trials regularly entail a battle of the experts.”).
Id. (“In the vast majority of cases . . . verdicts of not criminally responsible are
uncontested.”).
Perlin, supra note 11, at 624–25 (“For every insanity defense ‘refinement’ that paralleled
greater comprehension of human behavior, there has been a concomitant regression as a
result of a highly-publicized case bringing about an unpopular verdict.”).
See id. at 613 (Sensationalized trials “reflect [society’s] basic dissatisfaction with the
perceived incompatibility of the due process and crime-control models of criminal law, and
with the notion of psychiatric excuses allowing a ‘guilty’ defendant to ‘beat the rap’ and escape
punishment.”) (footnotes omitted).
See Kachulis, supra note 12, at 254–55 (“[W]hen [the media] does report on the insanity
defense, messages and narratives are sensationalized, with portrayals of defendants as
dangerous and deserving of punishment . . . . These sensationalized portrayals of insanity
defense cases foster the public’s belief that the insanity defense allows defendants to get off
easy or puts dangerous people back on the streets.”) (footnote omitted).
Perlin, supra note 11, at 652–53.
See Kachulis, supra note 12, at 255; Perlin supra note 11, at 606–07.
Perlin, supra note 11, at 664.
See id. at 606–07. Insanity defense jury cases are incredibly difficult to win even with a lot
of data. Interview with Dr. Flores, supra note 49.
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severely impact mentally ill individuals during trial. 109 There is strong juror
bias surrounding the insanity defense from both common public
misconceptions regarding the defense, and individual sentiments about
retribution occurring independently from any action of defense attorneys. 110
It can be extremely difficult to convince a jury of people, or a judge, that an
individual did not know what they were doing was wrong simply because the
defense criteria are so stringent. 111 The legal definition of insanity varies
between jurisdictions and this variability influences whether a defendant
raises an insanity defense; studies have shown that juries may be more
willing to convict if the jurisdiction holds a stricter definition of insanity. 112
Studies show that jurors misunderstand the impact of a NGRI verdict. 113 In
fact, a study from 2005 found that only fifty-five percent of jurors in their
sample correctly identified the legal definition of NGRI. 114 In a 2012 study,
fifty-four percent of jurors incorrectly believed that a defendant convicted of
the crime would be sent to a psychiatric hospital instead of prison. 115 In the
same study, more than half of the participants who returned a guilty verdict
falsely believed the defendant would be released from custody upon a
NGRI verdict instead of being committed to a psychiatric hospital. 116
Public distrust of the insanity defense, along with controversial insanity
trials with extensive media attention, helped create what many jurisdictions
refer to as the “guilty but mentally ill” verdict (GBMI). 117 A defendant given
this verdict receives the same sentence they would have if found guilty. 118
Critically, the jury can misunderstand the impact of this sentence. 119 An
individual deemed GBMI only receives the mental health care “available to
any inmate.” 120 Therefore, GBMI verdicts do not give any additional
Adjorlolo, supra note 54, at 4 (based on a study conducted by Sloat and Frierson in 2005,
with a sample of ninety-six jurors).
See Kachulis, supra note 12, at 253 (“Multiple studies have concluded that strong juror
biases exist during trials when the insanity defense is used.”); Perlin, supra note 11, at 653–
55.
Interview with Dr. Flores, supra note 49.
Natalie Jacewicz, ‘Guilty but Mentally Ill’ Doesn’t Protect Against Harsh Sentences, NAT’L
PUB.
RADIO,
(Aug.
2,
2016),
https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2016/08/02/486632201/guilty-but-mentally-ill-doesnt-protect-against-harsh-sentences
[https://perma.cc/4S3L-NYCK] [hereinafter Guilty but Mentally Ill].
Adjorlolo, supra note 54, at 4.
109

110

111
112

113
114
115
116

Id.
Id.
Id.

Jurisdictions use different terms that all equate to “guilty but mentally ill” to describe the
potential verdict when a defendant successfully pleads insanity. Roberson & Smothermon,
supra note 14, at 2350–51; Fischer, supra note 1.
Roberson & Smothermon, supra note 14, at 2351.
Bard, supra note 22, at 38 (“[J]uries may give a GBMI verdict with the ‘false belief’ that
the defendants will ‘actually receive treatment.’”).
Id. at 39–40 (“[I]t does not appear that GBMI defendants receive anything but the
inadequate care available to any inmate.”).
117
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assistance to the defendant, and in fact may parole efforts. 121 Even though
GBMI offers little to no protection for the mentally ill defendants, jurors
tend to favor this verdict if available, possibly believing it is a kind of middle
ground. 122 Unfortunately, this is not true. 123
Even when a jury does fully understand the verdict, it can be very hard
for courts and juries to trust evidence of mental illness. 124 Studies reflect that
the public has a “common sense” feeling that experts on the psychologically
imprecise and invisible branch of study are not as trustworthy as experts
from fields with more “objective” data. 125 Many people, including jurors,
have difficulty conceptualizing a person being so mentally ill that they lack
the ability to reason or understand what they are doing. 126 This may be
particularly true because it is especially hard for a jury to understand a
person’s inability to differentiate right from wrong when it seems as though
their actions have some logic. 127 Evidence involving mental illness tends to
be viewed with more hostility than testimony for even a difficult-to-prove
physical disease. 128 While many things are still unknown in the field of
medicine—many inferences and judgement calls can be made in any medical
case 129—differences of medical opinion are allowed in the courtroom, and
medicine is still accepted by the law. 130 Comparatively, the biases of mental
illness stigma and deeply held stereotypes severely impact society’s
acceptance and perception of mental health experts, evidence, and the
mentally ill. 131

B. There Is No System Protecting the Mentally Ill
While it may be constitutional for states to abolish the insanity defense,

121
122
123
124

Interview with Dr. Flores, supra note 49.
Guilty but Mentally Ill, supra note 112.
Id.
Faith Hayman, Mental Illness and the Credibility Crucible, 74 ADVOC. 197, 201 (2016)

(Can.) (“The reaction of most people who encounter mental illness is unease or instinctive
rejection, even moral judgment.”).
Perlin, supra note 11, at 680–81.
Cf. Sarah Lustbader, A Precarious Time for the Insanity Defense, THE APPEAL (Feb. 25,
2020),
https://theappeal.org/a-precarious-time-for-the-insanity-defense/
[https://perma.cc/WR2T-RN29] (“One of the first things law students learn in criminal law
class is that a person whose body is used as a projectile by another person to cause harm
cannot be criminally prosecuted. This seems intuitive to most students. But somehow, if a
person’s body is controlled by a mentally ill brain, not another person, it no longer makes
sense.”); see Adjorlolo, supra note 54, at 3–4.
Interview with Dr. Flores, supra note 49.
Perlin, supra note 11, at 723.
Interview with Dr. Stinson, supra note 53.
Id. Conversely, psychology is considered a “soft science,” and because experts are not able
to take a picture of the brain and show a jury what is going on, people are skeptical. E.g., id.
125
126

127
128
129
130

131

Id.
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it is terrible public policy, with definitive consequences. 132 Kansas, for
example, does not have an insanity defense and instead requires evidence
of mental health to disprove the mens rea component at trial. 133 There is a
key difference, however, between an individual’s ability to determine right
from wrong, and an individual’s criminal intent. 134 In other words, mens rea
and insanity are very different: mens rea evidence serves only to disprove
an element of the prima facie case, while a true insanity defense operates as
an excuse regardless of the prima facie elements present. 135 Likewise, a claim
of non-responsibility is different from a claim of no intent. 136 An individual
can have the full intent to murder another, and therefore have the requisite
intent, but be so deeply mentally disorganized that they should not be held
criminally responsible for their actions, even with proof of that intent. 137
Ultimately, mens rea is not an accurate measure of rationality. 138 Thus, using
mens rea alone as the test for whether an individual can claim insanity is a
fundamentally insufficient defense for this vulnerable population. 139
The ability to abolish the defense is a symptom of the broader mental
health crisis in the criminal justice system. 140 There used to be a whole
system of psychiatric hospitals set up to care for those with severe mental
illness. 141 The 1960s showed a time of dramatic change in the treatment of
mental illness when a series of exposés highlighted the inhumane conditions
in many psychiatric hospitals, and then-President John F. Kennedy led mass
deinstitutionalization of the nation in response to the national outcry. 142
President Kennedy promised deinstitutionalization as the return of
freedom, liberty, and humane treatment to the mentally ill, while
Joseph Langerman, Note, The Montwheeler Effect: Examining the Personality Disorder
Exclusion in Oregon’s Insanity Defense, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1027, 1057 (2018).
See Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1023 (2020).
Joshua Dressler, Kahler v. Kansas: Ask the Wrong Question, You Get the Wrong Answer,
132

133
134

18 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 409, 418 (2020) (“Indeed, to suggest that a defendant who introduces
evidence in order to raise a reasonable doubt regarding one of the prima facie elements of
the crime is thereby raising a ‘defense’ is to blur the distinction between asserting an
affirmative defense and merely casting doubt on the government’s case-in-chief.”). But cf.,
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1034 (reasoning that an inability to know right from wrong indicates
lack of criminal intent rather than insanity).
See Stephen J. Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between Legal Insanity
and Mens Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1071, 1074–75
(2007).
135

136
137
138

Id.
See id. at 1082–91.
See Erickson, supra note 11 (“To be rational is to have reasons based on accurate

perceptions and the ability to form sound judgments.”).
See id. (“Crazy reasons are not just bad reasons; they are reasons that arise from
fundamental defects of the mind.”).
Fischer, supra note 1.
Lustbader, supra note 126.
Id. (“Deinstitutionalization decreased the population of people in state psychiatric hospitals
from 559,000 in 1955 to 154,000 in 1980. There are now fewer than 43,000.”); Fischer,
supra note 1.
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incorporating more effective treatments in the community. 143 However,
President Kennedy’s hope that mentally ill individuals could be cared for
by their community failed to materialize in the subsequent years and
decades. 144 Deinstitutionalization failed because community care centers
never received funding and supportive housing failed to meet the supply
demands. 145 Since then, the cost of such services and psychiatric care has
only grown. 146 The mass deinstitutionalization of the nation created new
problems with how the nation treats the mentally ill, and the current health
care administration and organization in the United States is inadequate to
fully deal with and meet the needs of the mentally ill. 147
Notably, the only individuals in the United States with a right to health
care are those in prison. 148 Prisons are the biggest providers of mental health
services in this country. 149 The -prevalence of the mentally ill in prisons has
to do with how the United States deals with the mentally ill and the
fundamental failure to provide adequate mental health resources that would
assist those with severe mental illness. 150 Additionally, the prison
environment is retributive in nature, and about as far from a therapeutic
environment as possible. 151 Contrary to popular belief, mental health
treatment in prisons does not even have some minimal standard to meet. 152
The majority of prison inmates have some kind of mental illness, but mental

Interview with Dr. Stinson, supra note 53. The community mental health systems never
received funding, and these people “saved” by deinstitutionalization ended up without
support. Id. Now, we fund the Department of Rehabilitations and Corrections more than
any other agency. Id.
Lustbader, supra note 126 (“Kennedy vowed that the ‘cold mercy of custodial isolation,’
would be ‘supplanted by the open warmth of community concern and capability,’ but the
second part of that vision never materialized.”); Fischer, supra note 1 (“Part of the problem
is that the nation’s mental health care system is stuck in a sort of limbo.”).
Patty Mulcahy, As a White Woman With Untreated Schizophrenia, I Was Never Deemed
a
Threat.
Many
Aren’t
as
Fortunate,
WBUR,
(Dec.
7,
2020),
https://amp.wbur.org/cognoscenti/2020/12/07/mental-illness-schizophrenia-health-carerace-patty-mulcahy [https://perma.cc/DMA2-YM68].
143

144

145

146

Id.

Bard, supra note 22, at 2–3.
Id. at 14–15 (“In what strikes most people as unfair, under our current system the only
people with a right to health care are those imprisoned by the state. As a result, the mentally
ill are guaranteed treatment only when they have brought themselves to the attention of the
criminal justice system by committing a crime, or the civil justice system by exhibiting striking,
public, dangerous behavior.”) (footnote omitted).
Interview with Dr. Stinson, supra note 53. The promise of deinstitutionalization was just
the promise of reinstitutionalization. See, e.g., id.
Bard, supra note 22, at 3.
Lustbader, supra note 126 (“What can putting that person in prison possibly do? It will, of
course, increase the chances that corrections officers, trained to get prisoners to submit to
authority rather than treat mental illness, will beat my client, throw him into solitary
confinement, or worse. But will it engender accountability? Safety? Justice?”).
Hooper, supra note 23, at 413–14.
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health care in prisons is critically underfunded. 153 Putting the severely
mentally ill in prison can do little to help that individual or achieve the goals
society intends with the use of sentencing. 154 In fact, newer research suggests
that punishment actually increases violence, while the traditional
understanding is that punishment through prison acts as a deterrent to
further crime. 155
Those who struggle with mental illness also face the enormous societal
adversary of stigma. 156 This stigma contributes to the severe
misunderstanding of the mentally ill, including a prominent misconception
that those with mental illness are dangerous or even to blame for their
mental condition. 157 This makes assessing mental illness in court much more
difficult. 158 The court may also struggle with mental illness because all “rights
and remedies are fashioned with the reasonable person in mind,” and
because our laws expect persons to act in a reasonable way to promote a
civilized society. 159 Debilitating mental illness, by its very nature, disrupts the
individual’s ability to participate in society as a socially reasonable person. 160
Amplifying the uncertainty and misunderstandings regarding mental

153
154

Id. at 412–14.
See Lustbader, supra note 126 (questioning if putting the mentally ill in prison actually

provides accountability, safety, and justice).
James Gilligan, Why We Should Universalize the Insanity Defense and Replace
Punishment with Therapy and Education, 46 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 225, 229
(2019) (“[I]t would seem that if we set out to create the conditions that would produce the
maximal amount of violence, we could hardly do better than to create the punitive criminal
justice system that we have established in the U.S.”).
Anna S.P. Wong, Mental Illness: Let’s See It as a Strength Not a Liability, 77 ADVOC. 523,
527 (2019) (Stigma “is arguably the greatest adversary that people with mental illness are up
against.”); Vickers, supra note 19, at 56 (“Despite medical advances, our society remains
ignorant of mental illnesses. This is a result of stigma and prejudice . . . . Many people fear,
ridicule, and discriminate against what they do not understand.”).
Id. (People with mental illness “are handicapped by mainstream endorsement of negative
stereotypes and prejudicial attitudes toward mental illness . . . .”); Patrick W. Corrigan, Amy
C. Watson, Amy C. Warpinski & Gabriela Gracia , Implications of Educating the Public on
Mental Illness, Violence, and Stigma, 55 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 577, 577 (2004) (“Results of
a nationwide probability survey showed that 75 percent of the public view persons with
mental illness as dangerous.”); Patrick W. Corrigan & Amy C. Watson, At Issue: Stop the
Stigma: Call Mental Illness a Brain Disease, 30 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 477, 478 (2004)
(“Many studies have found that the public views people with mental illness as responsible for
their disorders: because of poor character or moral backbone, people with disorders like
schizophrenia and major depression choose to have their mental illness and are to blame for
the symptoms and the disabilities that result.”).
See Hayman, supra note 124, at 197.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 200 (“Mental illness comes in many forms and cannot be treated as a uniform entity,
but in some way or other, if mental illness is disabling, it will likely startle and disrupt the
paradigm of the reasonable person.”).
155

156

157
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illness is the ambiguity of diagnosis. 161 Determining mental status and
appreciation of wrongfulness is difficult and may lead to conflicting
diagnoses such as in the case of Clark v. Arizona, where psychiatrists from
each side came to different conclusions. 162 Despite the uncertainty of
psychological diagnosis, forensic psychologists are a necessity in cases of an
insanity defense or for those with severe mental illness. The field of forensic
psychology is the intersection of psychology with the court system. 163
Forensic psychology experts are different from other psychologists and
should be used specifically in these kinds of trials since they are specially
trained to consider information relevant to law, like potential secondary gain
for an individual claiming mental illness. 164 Forensic psychology experts and
psychiatric experts can assess the dangerousness of an individual. 165 Forensic
psychologists are also trained on how to testify so they can show their
knowledge in a clear and concise way for the trier of fact. 166
Insight into the fields of psychology and psychiatry could provide
invaluable assistance to the legal profession to help jurors and judges alike
obtain a more complete understanding of mental illness. Historically, the
fields of law and psychology have not worked with each other. 167 Law and
psychology are fields with different goals, an express reason why there is so
much policy conflict between them. 168 The existing conflict arises from the
legal system’s fear that any reliance on the aid of psychiatrists will result in
too much power over legal decision-making being given to the expert rather
than the decision-maker. 169 The law is prone to considering psychology
experts as unable to conceptualize the legal concept of criminal
responsibility given the distance between the field of criminal law and
ideology of treatment. 170 Mental health law would seemingly be the
subdiscipline most likely to encourage interdisciplinary work. However,
Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1037 (2020) (“As the American Psychiatric Association
once noted, ‘insanity is a matter of some uncertainty.’”). The Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders itself is merely descriptive, and as such can be unreliable as to
underlying causes of behavior. BRUCE D. PERRY & MAIA SZALAVITZ, THE BOY WHO WAS
RAISED AS A DOG 286 (3d ed. 2017).
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 745 (2006).
Interview with Dr. Flores, supra note 49.
Id. For example, forensic psychologists are specially trained to spot malingering. Id.
161

162
163
164
165
166
167
168

Id.
Id.
See Clark, 548 U.S. at 777–78.
Asokan, supra note 24, at 197 (“Law is concerned with blameworthiness and medicine is

concerned with treatment. They are not identical with each other because their ‘concerns’
are different.”). It should be noted that psychology contributes to both the social sciences
and the field of medicine. Compare Christopher Suhler & Patricia Churchland, Psychology
and Medical Decision-Making, 9 AM. J. BIOETHICS 79 (2009) with Robert Nisbet & Liah
Greenfeld,
Social
Science,
ENCYC.
BRITANNICA
(Mar.
25,
2021),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/social-science [https://perma.cc/K6NX-4NMW].
Perlin, supra note 11, at 674.
See Clark, 548 U.S. at 777.
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mental health law grew out of the antipsychiatry movement and, as such, is
just as skeptical of experts as is the rest of the legal field. 171 The legal system
remains dismissive of psychology as a whole. 172
In return, the law has been criticized as cruel and ignorant for not
keeping pace with scientific and medical understanding of the times. 173
Psychiatry and psychology, unlike the legal field with its veneration of brightline rules, exists easily in a state of internal disagreement, given that experts
can never definitively agree on the meanings of terms like “mental illness”
or “responsibility.” 174 Finding middle ground between psychology and the
law may be a bit like “putting a square peg in a round hole”; the law is
ultimately binary while psychology appreciates divergence. 175 While these
fields have traditionally not worked well together, a renewed understanding
of psychological concepts may help provide insight into both the underlying
philosophy of the insanity defense, and also how to make corrections to the
currently existing problems surrounding the defense.
IV.

PERSONALITY DISORDERS AND THE INSANITY
DEFENSE

For purposes of the insanity defense, personality disorders do not, and
should not, qualify as severe mental illness. 176 The reluctance of the United
States to mitigate responsibility for those with personality disorders is not
unique. 177 The primary distinction between personality disorders and mental
illness is that mental illness is a mental process that can lead to a sudden
change, while personality is a long-term psychological way of functioning. 178
Wexler, supra note 56, at 31 (“[M]odern mental health law, as part of the civil liberties
revolution, was conceived to correct the abusive exercise of state psychiatric power.
Accordingly, mental health law has in large measure been part of the antipsychiatry
movement, mistrustful of the mental health disciplines and of their practitioners.”).
See Perlin, supra note 11, at 602–03.
Kent Scheidegger, The Relation of Insanity to Crime, CRIME & CONSEQUENCES BLOG
(July 16, 2019), http://www.crimeandconsequences.com/crimblog/2019/07/the-relation-ofinsanity-to-cr.html [https://perma.cc/EH6Z-DTM2] (“Cruelty, ignorance, prejudice, and the
like, are freely ascribed to the law and to those who administer it, on the grounds that it is
said not to keep pace with the discoveries of science and to deny facts medically
ascertained.”).
Perlin, supra note 11, at 677.
See Michael Pierce, Case Comment, Commonwealth v. Shin, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 381
(2014), 97 MASS. L. REV. 15, 18 (2015).
See Fischer, supra note 1. A personality disorder is not a mental illness. Id. But see
Langerman, supra note 132, at 1049–50, 1059; Perlin, supra note 11, at 664 n.290.
Sparr, supra note 61, at 173 (“[M]ost other national jurisdictions have been reluctant to
allow mitigation of responsibility for individuals with a diagnosis of APD, sociopathy, or
psychopathy.”).
William Glaser, Morality and Medicine: The Law Reform Commission’s Concept of
171

172
173

174
175

176

177

178

‘Mental Illness’ Provides a Rationale for Continued Indefinite Detention of ‘Dangerous’
Offenders, 15 LEGAL SERV. BULL. 114, 115 (1990) (“The key distinction which needs to be
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Personality disorders are chronic through time, and pervasive across
different contexts. 179 Those with personality disorders are excluded because
they, by their disorder’s very definition, do not qualify under the insanity
test. 180 A person with a personality disorder is able to differentiate right from
wrong; no mental deficit is making them lose touch with reality, but they
may behave in ways society deems unacceptable anyway. 181 A majority of
those incarcerated for violent crimes exhibit a personality disorder. 182 While
personality disorders cannot be used in the insanity defense, they can be
used to mitigate any potential sentence. 183
Personality disorders are relatively common among Americans, with
at least one serious personality disorder found in an estimated ten to twenty
percent of the population. 184 An individual’s personality traits only constitute
a personality disorder when they “are inflexible and maladaptive and cause
significant functional impairment.” 185 Personality disorders are marked by
significant impairments in interpersonal relationships and are diagnosed
according to the criteria in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-V for the fifth edition, DSM generally). 186 The DSM,
currently in its fifth edition, is the “Bible” for those in mental health. 187
Under the DSM-V, personality disorders are organized into three distinct
clusters. 188 Given the wide variety of personality disorders, this Note focuses
on the effects of antisocial personality disorder (APD). APD falls under
kept in mind is between personality (including ‘disordered’ personality), i.e. the way one has
psychologically functioned since childhood, and illness, i.e. a process which can lead to a
dramatic and often sudden change on one’s psychological functioning.”).
Interview with Dr. Stinson, supra note 53. Personality cannot be changed because
personality is an untreatable, unchangeable state of existence. Interview with Dr. Flores,
supra note 49.
Insanity Defense: Psychopaths and Sociopaths, LAW LIBR. – AM. L. & LEGAL INFO.,
https://law.jrank.org/pages/7670/Insanity-Defense-Psychopaths-Sociopaths.html
[https://perma.cc/H3Q4-LWEW]; see AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STAT.
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 645 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V].
Interview with Dr. Flores, supra note 49.
Michael H. Stone, Violent Crimes and Their Relationship to Personality Disorders, 1
PERSONALITY AND MENTAL HEALTH 138, 138 (2007).
Interview with Dr. Flores, supra note 49.
Anthony Zorich, Disorder in Family Court: Addressing Personality Disorders in HighConflict Family Law Cases, 70 NWLAWYER 34, 34 (2016). Every human being has a
personality, and so disorders related to personality are relatively common among the general
population. Sparr, supra note 61, at 169.
DSM-V, supra note 180, at 647.
Zorich, supra note 184, at 34; Elizabeth Wittenberg, Are Your Clients Making You Crazy?:
How to Avoid Drama with Maddening Clients, 68 BENCH & B. MINN. 20, 21 (2011)
(“Personality disorders are defined as enduring patterns of behavior and subjective
experience that affect a person’s thinking, feeling, relationships, and impulsiveness. Often
the affected person sees these patterns as perfectly reasonable and appropriate despite their
dramatic, negative impact on her daily life and the lives of those around her.”).
Perry & Szalavitz, supra note 161, at 287.
Zorich, supra note 184, at 34; see DSM-V, supra note 180, at 649–82.
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Cluster B disorders. 189 While the DSM-V is used to diagnose, it serves only
as a descriptive source: it can classify and categorize individuals, but only on
symptoms, not on underlying physiological causes of those symptoms. 190
Thus, while the DSM is a great tool for categorization, it has limits on its
usefulness. 191 The specific way APD is classified in the DSM may not matter
for efforts to exclude it from the insanity defense; personality disorders are
excluded by the Model Penal Code test through a description of behavior
instead of diagnostic category. 192
While more personality disorders than APD are overrepresented in
prison, 193 this Note focuses on the lessons that can be learned from APD in
particular. 194 Commonly known as psychopathy or sociopathy, APD is
characterized as a kind of “moral insanity.” 195 The Mayo Clinic defines APD
as “a mental disorder in which a person consistently shows no regard for
right and wrong and ignores the rights and feelings of others.” 196 A typical
prerequisite for a diagnosis of APD is a showing of conduct disorder before
the age of fifteen. 197 This may mean that an individual with APD has behaved
in a socially unacceptable way for a significant portion of their life. 198 Those
with APD suffer from a lack of compassion; while they can imagine the
experiences of another, they do not care about that person, only how other

189
190
191

See DSM-V, supra note 180, at 659–66.
Perry & Szalavitz, supra note 161, at 286.
Id. at 287; see also DSM-V, supra note 180, at 25 (“[T]he use of DSM-5 should be

informed by an awareness of the risks and limitations of its use in forensic settings.”).
Slovenko, supra note 17, at 183.
Randy A. Sansone & Lori A. Sansone, Borderline Personality and Criminality, 6
PSYCHIATRY (EDGMONT) 16, 17 (2009); see Stone, supra note 182, at 138 (“While
admixtures of traits from several disorders are common among violent offenders, certain
ones are likely to be the main disorder: antisocial PD, Psychopathy, Sadistic PD, Paranoid
PD and NPD.”); Helen M. Farrell, Dissociative Identity Disorder: No Excuse for Criminal
Activity, 10 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY, at 33–34, 39–40 (2011).
Other personality disorders are not so interrelated with violence and crime as APD and
may even be reversible over time. E.g., NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER 4,
https://infocenter.nimh.nih.gov/pubstatic/QF%2017-4928/QF%2017-4928.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B9VZ-QH2J] [hereinafter NIH PUBLICATION NO. QF 17-4928]
(“Borderline personality disorder has historically been viewed as difficult to treat. But with
newer, evidence-based treatment, many people with borderline personality disorder
experience fewer and less severe symptoms, improved functioning . . . .”).
Slovenko, supra note 17, at 184 (“In psychiatric circles, the psychopath is one who is
morally insane—that is, one without a sense of morals, an unprincipled person, a person
whose conscience is full of holes. There is a lack of guilt or remorse, an absence of anxiety,
and a failure to learn by experience.”).
Antisocial Personality Disorder, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseasesconditions/antisocial-personality-disorder/symptoms-causes/syc-20353928
[https://perma.cc/CP2J-3DAM] [hereinafter Mayo Clinic].
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Id.
See id.
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people will affect them. 199 Individuals with APD traditionally have a
disregard for social norms with little, if any, regard for right or wrong. 200
Perhaps because of this, APD is associated with crime. 201 There is no
treatment for APD, and the cause remains unknown. 202 More recent
developmental psychology theories describe that while APD may have
genetic factors, development of the disorder probably has a lot more to do
with early stages of life. 203 Dr. Bruce Perry, an American psychiatrist and
leading researcher and clinician for the development of children with
trauma, describes that early childhood experiences are critical for
developing empathy. 204 Dr. Perry describes an individual with APD as
“emotionally frozen” and “emotionally blind,” a result of childhood neglect
leaving them incapable of feeling empathy. 205 In popular media, a person
with APD is described as a “psychopath.” 206 That term is no longer used in
the DSM. 207 An individual with psychopathic traits necessarily has the
characteristics of antisocial personality disorder. 208 However, not all
individuals with antisocial personality disorders are psychopathic. 209
Consider the following case. In December 2012, Jerrod Murray killed
Generro Sanchez. 210 Murray composed and implemented a detailed plan to
execute a fellow college classmate, and he selected Sanchez at random. 211
Perry & Szalavitz, supra note 161, at 127–28 (describing those with APD as being
“emotionally frozen, in an ice that distorts not only their own feelings, but also how they see
the feelings of others and then respond to them”).
See Zorich, supra note 184, at 35 (Those with APD may “seek to antagonize, manipulate,
or deceive others.”).
Id. (“APD has shown to be more common among men, and is closely associated with
crime.”); Anne G. Crocker, Kim Mueser, Robert Drake, Robin Clark, Gregory McHugo &
Theimann Ackerson, Antisocial Personality, Psychopathy, and Violence in Persons with
Dual Disorders: A Longitudinal Analysis, 32 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 452, 455 (2005)
(“Psychopathy is an important predictor of future criminal behavior, particularly violent
behavior.”); Does a Psychopath, supra note 97 (“Some of the country's more notorious
criminals, including Ted Bundy, who raped and killed dozens of women in the 1970s, and
Jeffrey Dahmer, who murdered and ate almost 20 boys in Wisconsin between 1978 and
1991, have been hypothesized to have had antisocial personality disorder.”). Upon the very
first iteration of the DSM, mental hospital superintendents worried that listing sociopathic
personality (currently known as APD) as a mental illness would send dangerous criminals to
hospitals rather than prisons. Slovenko, supra note 17, at 183.
MAYO CLINIC, supra note 196.
Perry & Szalavitz, supra note 161, at 115–16, 119–24.
199

200

201

202
203

Id.
Id. at 127–28, 134.
See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 1 (using “psychopathy” as a descriptor for APD).
See generally DSM-V, supra note 180.
Interview with Dr. Stinson, supra note 53.
Id. A different question exists as to whether those with personality disorders are mentally
ill. E.g., id. (noting that personality disorders are in the DSM, and thus categorized as a

204
205
206
207
208
209

mental disorder).
Roberson & Smothermon, supra note 14, at 2349.
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Murray showed no remorse or emotion during his confession. 212 Despite his
calculated plan, the court found Murray not guilty by reason of insanity and
sent him to a psychiatric hospital where it was determined a mere thirty-five
days later that he could be released. 213 The Murray case spurred changes to
Oklahoma’s insanity defense laws and modified the assessment that would
have let him free from the hospital. 214
The fact that an individual in Murray’s position was able to get a NGRI
verdict speaks to the potential problems in the insanity tests for each and
every jurisdiction around the country. The case of Jerrod Murray provides
a clear picture of why a person with APD should be excluded from the
insanity defense. 215 Continued insight into psychology can help identify a
more concrete standard. Using APD as a benchmark for who should not be
admitted helps to define who should be able to use the defense.
V.

THE SOLUTION: SAVING THE INSANITY DEFENSE

The mental health system is broken and a profound adjustment to the
current system is required. 216 It needs to be easier for individuals to be found
NGRI. 217 Criminal responsibility and the insanity doctrine reflect the
evolution of criminal law, which necessitates a complicated balancing of
social policy, moral culpability, and scientific understanding. 218 The law itself
can be a force that promotes therapeutic consequences. 219 Uncertainty and
fear are currently undermining the use of the insanity defense, leading to an
increased public policy effort to continually narrow the defense. 220
Controversy over the defense obscures the deeper and growing crisis of
Id.; Crime Vault, Murder Confession: Jerrod Murray | A Well-Mannered Murderer,
YOUTUBE
(Apr.
5,
2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ic7pNnL4ZCo
[https://perma.cc/SRZ3-8UCM].
Roberson & Smothermon, supra note 14, at 2350.
Id. (“In the new law, the word 'presently' was stricken from the definitions, allowing the
evaluator to consider past history in making his determination.”).
Anthony Montwheeler also demonstrated symptoms of antisocial personality disorder.
Fischer, supra note 1 (noting “[a]nti-social personality disorders, or psychopathy . . . do not
meet the threshold of the insanity defense” and that “[p]ersonality disorders are excluded”
because “‘that’s who the prison system is for.’”).
Bard, supra note 22, at 9 (“The country’s failure to provide adequate mental health
treatment should be seen as a massive failure of public health policy that has resulted in
people with mental illness being incarcerated in settings that violate fundamental fairness as
well as their Eighth Amendment right to receive adequate health care in prison.”); Interview
with Dr. Flores, supra note 49; Interview with Dr. Stinson, supra note 53.
Interview with Dr. Flores, supra note 49. Increasing the allowance of NGRI results
increases the institutional help given to the severely mentally ill when they commit crimes.
212

213
214

215

216

217

See id.
Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1028, 1036 (2020).
See Wexler, supra note 56, at 32 (“Therapeutic jurisprudence is the study of the role of
law as a therapeutic agent. It looks at the law as a social force that, like it or not, may produce
therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences.”).
See Perlin, supra note 11, at 624–25 (noting recurrent constriction of the insanity defense).
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mental illness within the criminal justice system. 221 Without a clear definition
and target recognizing the background and principles of the defense, these
laws will still allow individuals through who should not receive the defense,
while excluding many who desperately need hospitalization instead of
prison. 222 A properly organized defense can cover the appropriate
individuals as is necessary for society without overly extending the defense. 223
Writing a cogent and workable insanity defense test can be very
challenging; it must be simple enough for a jury to understand, and yet must
be workable with current science and the passage of time. 224 As Supreme
Court Justice Kagan noted in the recent Kahler v. Kansas opinion in March
2020, writing an accurate insanity defense law “involves choosing among
theories of moral and legal culpability,” which are also comprehensively full
of controversy. 225 However, having an inaccurate insanity test is better than
nothing at all, as it allows those defendants who commit crimes in the midst
of their mental illness to obtain needed mental health care, even if the
treatment is imposed involuntarily. 226
First and foremost, the existence of the insanity defense is crucial for
those with debilitating mental conditions, and society as a whole. A lack of
a NGRI defense is thus an injustice to this population and is continually
harmful to broader society. 227 A better understanding of psychology can
outline the basic principles that should be required for every insanity test.
Finally, education and increased community support are requisites for
making any kind of positive change for the mentally ill in the United States.

Fischer, supra note 1 (“According to the most recent estimates, 37 percent of prisoners
and 44 percent of jail inmates have been told by a mental health professional at some point
in their lives that they suffer from a mental disorder.”).
Who should receive the defense is an allocation of resources question; while personality
disorders can be classified as another type of mental illness, personality disorders are
commonly not responsive to treatment. Compare Langerman, supra note 132, at 1049–50,
1059 and Perlin, supra note 11, at 664 n.290 with Fischer, supra note 1 and Interview with
Dr. Flores, supra note 49. Thus, institutionalization following a NGRI verdict is better spent
on those who can receive treatment. Cf. Fischer, supra note 1 (arguing the prison system is
for those with APD).
Scheidegger, supra note 173 (“[T]he principle which they have laid down will be found,
when properly understood and applied, to cover every case which ought to be covered by
it.”).
Dale E. Bennett, The Insanity Defense - A Perplexing Problem of Criminal Justice, 16 LA.
L. REV. 484, 484 (1956).
Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1037 (2020).
Dressler, supra note 134, at 424 (noting that “by retaining an insanity defense, a [mentally
ill individual] can potentially avoid a finding of moral responsibility and obtain needed
mental health care.”).
Cf. Arthur J. Lurigio, Angie Rollins & John Fallon, The Effects of Serious Mental Illness
on Offender Reentry, 68 FED. PROB. 45, 47–48 (2004) (implying consistent recidivism is
counterproductive to the purposes behind sentencing).
221
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A. The Insanity Defense Is a Necessity
The insanity defense is necessary for individuals with severe mental
illness. The severely mentally ill represent a vulnerable population. These
individuals are more likely to end up in prison, and once in prison are more
likely to experience assault and abuse. 228 The NGRI defense makes sure that
these individuals get the psychiatric care that they need—the kind of care
that is not available in prison and is not adequately available in the
community. 229 Having a stronger insanity defense can also help fix the
mental health crisis in the criminal justice system: around seventy-seven
percent of the 200,000 prior offenders with severe mental illnesses will be
rearrested within five years for violent crimes. 230 Without this defense, the
individuals with severe mental illness are locked up in prison without the
proper care and then let out into the communities once their sentence is
over to recommit these crimes. 231 Those with severe mental illness need
help, not incarceration. Jail is not a therapeutic environment and can make
symptoms worse. 232 The NGRI defense not only gets these individuals the
care that they need in a hospitalized setting, but can also help the broader
community by reducing recidivism. 233 Almost all kinds of mental illnesses
are very treatable to the extent that an individual with severe mental illness
who takes their medication and has their symptoms under control
represents no greater threat to the community than anyone else. 234 The
NGRI system can help these individuals get their symptoms under control
and become one support in a broader system for this population. Even
when those judged NGRI may be confined to a mental hospital for longer
See E. Lea Johnston, Vulnerability and Just Desert: A Theory of Sentencing and Mental
Illness, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 150–51, 160 (2013) (“[J]ust as individuals with

228

major mental disorders are vulnerable to victimization in the outside world, they are more
susceptible than non-ill persons to physical and sexual assault in prison.”); Developments in
the Law: The Law of Mental Illness, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1114, 1145 (2008) [hereinafter
Developments] (noting that “[t]he mentally ill often have a particularly difficult time coping
with prison conditions and complying with regulations. In turn, many prison officials treat
disordered behavior as disorderly behavior . . . .”).
See, e.g., Adjorlolo, supra note 54, at 18 (reciting the adjunct treatments available for
acquitees).
Fischer, supra note 1; see Developments, supra note 228, at 1169.
Interview with Dr. Flores, supra note 49.
Developments, supra note 228, at 1145 (The disciplinary measures in prison may
“exacerbate the illnesses contributing to the inmates’ conduct.”); Vickers, supra note 19, at
58–59 (“Time is of the essence in mental illness recovery—just as it is in cancer or heart
disease. Incarcerating a child or adult for aggressive behavior or an act of bad judgment which
is based in symptoms of mental illness . . . might lessen the chance for recovery and for a
normal life upon completion of the rehabilitation and sentence.”).
Cf. Lurigio et al., supra note 227 (implying recidivism is bad for the community).
Interview with Dr. Stinson, supra note 53. Providing mental health treatment has additional
potential benefits for the mentally ill in prison who do not meet the NGRI defense threshold:
Research suggests that providing psychiatric services to violent prison populations is enough
to almost entirely reduce the crime within the prison. Gilligan, supra note 155, at 229.
229
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(in some cases) than their alternative time of imprisonment, this may be an
effective way to both protect the public and give the individual the care they
need. 235
Ultimately, the defense is needed to help these individuals cope with
any additional stigma. 236 They already have to cope with the stigma that
comes with being mentally ill; 237 adding the stigma of a criminal conviction
can negatively affect their ability to retain any employment, housing, or
public assistance that they may have otherwise been able to keep. 238 The
insanity defense should also be treated as a real defense. Mentally ill
individuals granted NGRI are susceptible to becoming political pawns when
judges determine, due to their offense, that they should never get out of the
psychiatric hospital. 239 The same would never occur with any other
affirmative defense. 240
Likewise, jurisdictions that do not offer NGRI are not fully protecting
the mentally ill. Jurisdictions claiming proof of mens rea is sufficient for a
finding of criminal responsibility ignore the defendant’s capacity for limited
rationality given their mental illness. 241 The ability to reason and understand
reality are important to a mental health defense and should not be thus
limited by intent. 242 Under the test in Kansas (and similarly for the other
states with no NGRI defense), a defendant who intentionally commits an
act against another cannot claim the defense even if their mental illness
caused them to believe their actions were morally just. 243 The underlying
235
236

See Adjorlolo, supra note 54, at 7.
See Wong, supra note 156, at 527; Hayman, supra note 124, at 197 (“There is little in the

way of an analytical framework for assessing the evidence of plaintiffs advancing claims for
psychological loss and thus their testimony in court remains confused and murky, caught in
the strictures of the ‘reasonable person’ and mired in the stigma of mental illness.”).
Stigma, Prejudice, and Discrimination Against People with Mental Illness, AM.
PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOC.,
https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/stigma-anddiscrimination#:~:text=Stigma%20and%20discrimination%20can%20contribute,diagnosed
%20with%20severe%20mental%20illnesses [https://perma.cc/2DUU-DNQB] (determining
the harmful effects of stigma may include “[f]ewer opportunities for work, school or social
activities or trouble finding housing,” among others).
REBECCA VALLAS, MELISSA BOTEACH, RACHEL WEST & JACKIE ODUM, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS, REMOVING BARRIERS TO OPPORTUNITY FOR PARENTS WITH CRIMINAL
RECORDS AND THEIR CHILDREN: A TWO-GENERATION APPROACH 5–7 (2015),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/09060720/CriminalRecordsreport2.pdf?_ga=2.115763782.1548785377.1630365988-14502360.1630365988
[https://perma.cc/7RRP-BZZG].
Interview with Dr. Stinson, supra note 53.
237

238

239
240

Id.

Erickson, supra note 11 (“Just about all human actions are intended but what we care about
is why they are done.”).
Id. (“There is a world of difference between killing someone to gain his wallet and someone
who kills under the delusion that the victim is the devil who has come to harm his children.”).
Eric Roytman, Commentary, Kahler v. Kansas: The End of the Insanity Defense?, 15
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 43, 54 (2020) (noting that “in Kansas, a defendant
241
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values and principles of traditional insanity defense jurisprudence contend
the insane defendant should not have been found guilty in the first place. 244
While the end result of incarceration or institutionalization may end up
being the same as any other state, an insane defendant in Kansas carries a
much heavier burden. 245 The sentencing discretion offered in Kansas does
nothing to alleviate the stigma and criminal conviction-related consequences
that come with a guilty verdict. The current test in Kansas also ignores the
roots of the insanity test. The insanity defense should work as an affirmative
defense, not as a counterargument to an element of the government’s case. 246
While definitions of legal concepts may separately remain in the
domain of the states, there is a significant need for a more extensive
consistency between broadly held morality and criminal law. 247 The optimal
insanity test must remain true to the core values and fundamental principles
that have existed for centuries. 248 States should be able to individualize their
insanity defense, but to maintain the alignment between criminal law and
societally accepted morality, there should be basic requirements for each
insanity defense. 249 Additionally, the insanity defense should have
constitutional backing. 250 The Supreme Court could help define broader
consistency standards for such a defense. As it currently stands, the decision
regarding the insanity defense is left to the states. 251
Insight into psychology can help determine what a reasonable defense
looks like for the mentally ill, as well as who should be included under the
defense and why. Therefore, an important barrier to cross is that between
the law and mental health professionals. 252 Jurisprudence surrounding the
insanity defense has typically occurred with little regard for scientific

may be guilty of murder if he knowingly or intentionally kills someone, regardless of whether
he believed his killing to be morally justified” and also that “[t]his distinction demonstrates
that mens rea and moral capacity are fundamentally different concepts.”).
Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1049 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.; Dressler, supra note 134, at 422 (“[T]he very fact that a person is convicted of a crime
constitutes punishment in that it falsely stigmatizes the person if he is morally innocent.”).
Dressler, supra note 134, at 418.
See Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1047 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1045 (noting the insanity test has a core going all the way back to the “good and evil”
test).
Id. at 1047 (“[T]he general purpose—to ensure a rough congruence between the criminal
law and widely accepted moral sentiments—persists. To gravely undermine the insanity
defense is to pose a significant obstacle to this basic objective.”).
See Erickson, supra note 11. But see Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1021; Wexler, supra note 56,
at 38 (disentangling mental health law from constitutional law may make the field more
“international and comparative”).
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1047 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Hooper, supra note 23, at 414–15 (“Lawyers and judges do not understand psychiatrists
and psychologists (or even that they are different) . . . . Mental health professionals do not
understand the courts . . . . The only answer seems to be that we need more mental health
and legal cross-training.”).
244
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understandings. 253 There is a need for more education and cross-training
between these specialties. 254 As previously stated, forensic experts are crucial
when it comes to insanity cases. 255 While it could be argued insanity is
externally apparent to any lay juror, the severity and bizarreness of a crime
do not necessarily mean the defendant has a severe mental illness. 256 An
expert can show the absence of mental illness in spite of the
incomprehensible nature of a crime. 257

B. The Question of Who Should Get Covered by the Defense Remains
Reality has a lot more gray than the field of law would like to admit. 258
For example, an individual may maintain a perfect grasp on reality, and yet
undoubtedly be mentally ill. 259 The biggest difference between mental illness
and personality disorders when considering legal policy is that a group of
individuals with mental illness can all be effectively treated. 260 With the
limited resources of the system, more public safety principles are met by
excluding those with personality disorders, which remain untreatable, from
receiving a NGRI diagnosis. 261
The insanity defense is conceptualized as a mechanism whereby
certain people are not held responsible under the law due to their lack of
understanding of what they were doing. 262 Criminal responsibility is
traditionally informed by societally held norms and understandings of right
and wrong. 263 Those who must be covered by the insanity defense are those
who do not meet the threshold for criminal responsibility. Therefore, there
are three different types of people deserving an insanity defense: (1) those
who know what they are doing is wrong but cannot stop their actions; (2)
those who believe their actions are morally correct; and (3) those who do
253
254
255
256
257

Perlin, supra note 11, at 659.
Hooper, supra note 23, at 414–15.
Interview with Dr. Flores, supra note 49.

Id.
Id.

Vaknin, supra note 20.
Id. (“Some criminals are undoubtedly mentally ill but still maintain a perfect grasp on
reality (‘reality test’) . . . . The ‘perception and understanding of reality’, in other words, can
and does co-exist even with the severest forms of mental illness.”).
Lustbader, supra note 126. The differentiation between mental illness and personality
disorders is a concept derived by legal jurisprudence; the mental health field views
personality disorders as just another kind of mental disorder. But see Personality Disorders,
MAYO
CLINIC,
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/personalitydisorders/symptoms-causes/syc-20354463 [https://perma.cc/6QF8-VMMN] (“A personality
disorder is a type of mental disorder . . . .”).
Lustbader, supra note 126. This concept extends mostly to APD; some personality
disorders are more treatable and thus should be considered mental disorders for purposes
of the insanity defense. See NIH PUBLICATION NO. QF 17-4928, supra note 194.
Interview with Dr. Stinson, supra note 53.
See supra Part II.
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not understand what they are doing while committing the act.
First, the volitional impulse test may be hard for the public to
understand, but it is crucial to an insanity test. Current psychology indicates
that compulsion and volitional components of behavior should be a part of
the rationality tests. 264 Public skepticism of the volitional component of the
defense results from a crucial lack of understanding relating to the
disordered mind—those without serious mental illness cannot conceptualize
compulsion. 265
The reason why a person commits an action matters for purposes of
criminal responsibility. The question of why not only pertains to the mental
state, or mens rea, of a defendant, but also to their deeper psychology
involving their cognitions and their volitional control. The reason why an
individual acts is inherently wound up in their understanding of the world. 266
For example, taking Justice Breyer’s example from his dissent in Kahler, a
person who kills because a dog “told them to” has still murdered even
though their reality is significantly skewed. 267 In other words, this person
knows what they are doing, knows it is wrong, and probably is able to stop
if they wanted to because the reason they are committing the action—the
why—is not wrapped up in their volition. For another example, Jerrod
Murray chose to kill his classmate because he wanted to see what it felt
like. 268 The reason why he killed had both to do with his intent and his
mental state. 269 There is every indication that he had total volitional control
over his actions. 270 This means that Murray understood what he was doing
and could have stopped if he chose to. Conversely, consider the following
Asokan, supra note 24, at 191 (“Going by the current understanding of neurological
evidences of compulsion and lack of impulse control, rationality tests without the inclusion
of lack of control, seem to be outdated.”).
Bennett, supra note 224, at 487 (quoting State v. Maish, 185 P.2d 486 (Wash. 1947)) (“The
basis of a general judicial fear of the test is expressed in a 1947 Washington decision where
the court declared: ‘For myself I can not [sic] see how a person who rationally comprehends
the nature and quality of an act, and knows that it is wrong and criminal, can act through
irresistible innocent impulse. Knowing the nature of the act well enough to make him
otherwise liable for it under the law, can we say that he acts from irresistible impulse and not
criminal design and guilt?’”).
Erickson, supra note 11.
Kent Scheidegger, An Insanity Debate Goes to the Dogs, CRIME & CONSEQUENCES BLOG
(Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.crimeandconsequences.blog/?p=791 [https://perma.cc/4FB8D7RT] (“If a killing is otherwise murder (not a justifiable homicide), the fact that one is
ordered to do it by a human is not a defense, even if the human is the leader of one’s country.
We established that at Nuremberg. How does a delusional belief that one has been ordered
to do it by a dog make a difference? If the fact that the defendant believes were true, the
killing would still be murder.”).
Roberson & Smothermon, supra note 14; Across the Table, Jerrod Murray Full Length
Interrogation,
YOUTUBE
(Mar.
1,
2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cAlwGZQy6vM
[https://perma.cc/9CMZ-4FST]
[hereinafter Murray Interrogation].
See Murray Interrogation, supra note 268.
See Roberson & Smothermon, supra note 14; Murray Interrogation, supra note 268.
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hypothetical: Defendant F sends increasingly threatening letters to her state
representative under the delusional compulsion she will die if she does not.
Although she understands what she is doing and that her actions are morally
and legally wrong, she feels compelled to complete the action due to her
mental illness. Denying her use of the insanity defense despite her lack of
volitional control would be fundamentally unfair and unjust. Therefore, the
ideal insanity defense would have a volitional component to the test.
Second, when a person’s mental illness temporarily makes them think
their crime is morally justified, they should have the remedy of the insanity
defense. 271 Under the traditional insanity defense, a member of society who
is unable to appreciate right from wrong does not meet the level for criminal
responsibility. 272 The morality branch of the test must be carefully written to
account for those whose moral compass differs from that of the general
society. Some individuals have a temporary anomalous morality where they
view what they are doing as okay in the moment, even though when they
come to their senses, they fully realize their actions were not moral. 273 The
perfect insanity defense would allow these individuals to utilize the defense.
Some individuals, like those with APD, have a permanent anomalous
morality. 274 For people with APD, they can accurately claim they did not
know what they were doing was wrong, and so pass one of the tests under
M’Naghten. 275 For them and their anomalous morality, it was not wrong.
The perfect insanity defense would recognize this problem—the morality
test must be based upon an objective understanding of societal morality, as
opposed to one individual’s subjective moral code.
Consider the following hypothetical: Defendant M, in the middle of
severe paranoia, attacks his next-door neighbor under the delusional belief
his neighbor is about to initiate a terrorist attack against the U.S.
government. This defendant knew the meaning of his act and understood
what he was doing. However, in his unbalanced reality, he could no longer
comprehend the rightfulness or the wrongfulness of his actions. This is a
perfect case for the insanity defense. This defendant can receive treatment
for his paranoia and can be assessed for his potential future dangerousness
before being released into society. Conversely, consider the case of
Defendant B, a man who kills his neighbor’s dog because the barking
annoyed him. Though Defendant B feels no moral repercussions for the
killing of what was to him an annoyance, he has still committed an act that
See Lustbader, supra note 126 (“[W]hat can accountability even mean when a person has
no recollection of ever violating the law, and, after treatment, returns to his calm, law-abiding
self?”). But cf. Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1031 (2020) (“Kansas law directs a
conviction even if he believed the murder morally justified.”).
See supra Part II.
See Morse & Hoffman, supra note 135, at 1088–89.
See supra text accompanying notes 195–202.
Cf., e.g., Roberson & Smothermon, supra note 14, at 2349–51 (noting Murray was not
considered a danger after only thirty-five days due his claimed clack of understanding).
271

272
273
274
275

400

2022]

SAVING THE INSANITY DEFENSE

401

an objective observer would deem immoral. 276 While Defendant B
supposedly lacks understanding of the wrongfulness of his actions, his
morality is permanently anomalous from the rest of society. Therefore, he
should not be eligible for the insanity test.
Finally, the optimal insanity defense has a cognitive incapacity test.
There must be a way of humanely treating individuals who committed the
offense solely because of their severe mental illness. 277 It stands to reason, as
the Supreme Court has also noted, that a person who is so mentally ill as to
not understand what he is doing, cannot thus form accurate moral
understanding of the situation. 278 Consider the following hypothetical:
Defendant A, experiencing a psychotic break, believed demons were trying
to enter his home to kill his family, and so defended himself accordingly. In
reality, he injured a family member who attempted to calm him down.
Defendant A, due to his mental illness, lacks crucial understanding of the
reality that surrounds him. He does not understand what he is doing even if
he had the express intent to act. As such, he does not have the cognitive
capacity to form adequate criminal responsibility. The insanity defense is an
absolute requisite in a case like this. 279 Conversely, consider the hypothetical
of Defendant H who, in a fit of jealous rage, severely beat his girlfriend for
talking to another man. Defendant H may have felt temporarily out of
control, but his basic understanding of what he was doing, his understanding
of reality itself, was not skewed. Therefore, Defendant H may not use the
insanity defense despite arguing he did not understand what he was doing.
To summarize, basic elements of an insanity defense should be
required for every jurisdiction. These basic elements include the
requirement of a volitional (the why), moral (the wrongfulness), and
cognitive (the what) branch of the test. The standards for the test would also
exclude those with symptoms and behavior of APD. In applying these
standards, this broader test would allow more individuals to use the NGRI
defense, thus keeping these individuals out of prison and reducing
recidivism rates. A standardized model for an insanity test would also help
public understanding related to what a NGRI defense entails.

C. A Simple Change Is Not Enough
The insanity defense cannot be saved by a simple fiddling with
language. A more comprehensive change is necessary to make sure those
with severe mental illness can obtain NGRI verdicts. To mitigate popular
If not immoral for love of animals, then immoral for the protection of personal property.
Interview with Dr. Flores, supra note 49.
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 753–54 (2006). “In practical terms, if a defendant did not
know what he was doing when he acted, he could not have known that he was performing
the wrongful act charged as a crime.” Id. at 737.
See Lustbader, supra note 126 (“[W]hat can accountability even mean when a person has
no recollection of ever violating the law, and, after treatment, returns to his calm, law-abiding
self?”).
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misconceptions, stigma, and negative media portrayals of the defense and
mental illness in general, education is necessary regarding both mental
illness and the insanity defense. The broader change necessary also includes
increased community support for the mentally ill, and changes to the
availability of treatment.

1. Education Is Needed
There is little knowledge of mental illness among the general
population; these are illnesses that cannot be seen and can escape physical
detection. 280 The same save-the-public mentality pushing for incarceration
of the mentally ill for their “safety” caused the original overuse of
institutionalization in the first half of the twentieth century, resulting in the
mass deinstitutionalization movement. 281 Therefore, education is perhaps
the most important thing that could be offered to help the insanity defense. 282
Education should be focused on a balancing approach with the
primary intent to break down the common misconceptions related to
serious mental illness. 283 To achieve an accurate portrayal of mental illness,
the goal of the education must be specific and tuned precisely for the
intended audience to be most effective. 284 For example, education about
how mental illness is a biological disorder, similar to other chronic diseases,
can help decrease some stigma-associated repercussions such as the blame
and social avoidance traditionally directed at those with mental illness. 285
Increased education from a young age can help reduce stigma and
increase understanding. 286 Part of helping reduce the problem of mental
illness is recognizing the symptoms of mental illness in the juvenile
population, whether through regular doctor’s visits, or through the juvenile
court system. 287 Children can be taught about mental illness in order to
normalize it, thereby reducing future stigma of the unknown. 288
Hooper, supra note 23, at 409.
Bard, supra note 22, at 67 (Incarceration “serves the direct purpose of removing dangerous
individuals from society. The institutionalization of the mentally ill during the early 20th
century was similarly intended to keep them separate . . . .” But “[o]veruse of
institutionalization led to legal reforms that placed a high value on individual liberty and
spawned the de-institutionalization movement.”).
Vickers, supra note 19, at 60 (“Education—in the schools, in the courts, and everywhere
ignorance prevails—is imperative for a change to occur to restore our nation to mental
wellness.”).
Corrigan & Watson, supra note 157, at 477.
George S. Tolomiczenko, Paula N. Goering & Janet F. Durbin, Educating the Public
About Mental Illness and Homelessness: A Cautionary Note, 46 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 253,
256 (2001) (emphasizing “the importance of adjusting the form of a message to maximize
impact in the intended direction among a particular audience”).
Corrigan & Watson, supra note 157, at 477.
Interview with Dr. Stinson, supra note 53.
See Vickers, supra note 19, at 56–57.
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A popular strategy for educating the public has been to associate
mental illness with a disease of the brain. 289 While this approach may reduce
the blame put on those with mental illness, certain stigma like
dangerousness can be exacerbated. 290 The need for education should not be
fulfilled without due research into the proper way to educate the public;
certain types of education regarding mental illness can actually increase
stigma and social isolation. 291 While focusing on public awareness may
increase resources for mental health services, the added stigma with certain
types of education is not worth the risk. 292 For example, education should
not focus on the association between mental illness and dangerousness, as
this can lead to increased stigma. 293 Stigma is particularly hard to overturn as
exposure to “emotionally charged material” can actually push an
individual’s perceptions regarding the subject in a negative direction. 294
Education about mental illness is thus rather complicated, necessitating a
multi-faceted and dimensional approach to reduce stigma through proper
methods and with accurate facts. 295 Efforts to destigmatize through education
should be backed by studies showing effectiveness of the technique. 296
Reducing stigma involves a careful approach to balance exposure to the
subject matter while avoiding preconceived stereotypes. 297 Stigma is best
reduced through direct contact with affected persons. 298 Therefore, in the
course of attempting education about severe mental illness, the court might
try meeting with individuals with severe mental illness to gain more insight
into their daily existence. Additionally, education about treatment, and the
effectiveness of treatment for serious mental illnesses can reduce harmful
misconceptions about dangerousness. 299
Jury education is particularly important. With the limited knowledge
of the insanity defense systems and mental illness in the lay public, jury
misconceptions regarding the insanity defense can have lasting and
damaging impacts on the mentally ill population. 300 A simple misconception

289
290
291

Corrigan & Watson, supra note 157, at 477.
Id.
Id. at 577–80 (education focusing on the association between mental illness and

dangerousness resulted in an increase of stigma and a social isolating of the mentally ill).
See id. at 580.
Id. (negative attitudes cannot be avoided even with a disclaimer explaining violence not
being characteristic of those with severe mental illness); Tolomiczenko et al., supra note 284,
at 256 (showing certain materials can actually increase stigma).
Tolomiczenko et al., supra note 284, at 256.
Corrigan & Watson, supra note 157, at 478.
See Tolomiczenko et al., supra note 284, at 255–56 (while it may seem like an educational
video may help reduce stigma, this is in fact the opposite of what is shown in this study).
Id. at 256.
Id. at 253 (pointing out that “lower levels of perceived dangerousness were associated with
increased contact with persons suffering from mental illness”).
Corrigan & Watson, supra note 157, at 478.
See supra Part III.A.
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that NGRI means letting an individual back onto the streets may convince
a jury to send that individual to prison, where they will get inadequate
treatment. 301 The false idea that a GBMI verdict is a “halfway” point between
NGRI and prison must be corrected so that the juries can make a fully
informed choice, with a full understanding of the law and the consequences
of each decision. 302 The public should be educated about recovery for those
with mental illness, specifically that many of those with mental illness can
recover and lead healthy lives. 303 This information is crucial because the
juries deciding NGRI cases are not only deciding the facts of the case—their
decision can severely impact the life of an already suffering individual.
Educating the public about severe mental illness does not only
diminish the stigmas associated with having any kind of mental illness, but
also serves to diminish unrealistic fears surrounding the mentally ill that are
furthered by media portrayals. 304 More understanding of mental illness,
including knowledge relating to actual dangerousness of these individuals
and the success rates of treatment, can pressure legislatures to lessen the
limits on the defense. 305 Additionally, with more judicial knowledge of
mental illness, psychology, volitional control, and the like, judges may make
more informed decisions of when to let severely mentally ill individuals out
of hospitalization.

2. More Community Support Is Needed
Communities should give more attention to the needs of the mentally
ill. Efforts to create opportunities for help before an individual ends up in
police custody are optimal. 306 The insanity defense provides a unique and
much needed opportunity for the states to start providing the requisite
treatment for those who are severely mentally ill but end up in the criminal
justice system. 307 These severely mentally ill individuals are not getting
treatment in their communities because the services they need are extremely
hard to access given failures in state funding and insurance. 308 For example,
See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
Corrigan & Watson, supra note 157, at 477–78; Vickers, supra note 19, at 55.
See Kachulis, supra note 12, at 254.
See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 1 (noting that “insanity acquittals are often met with public

301
302
303
304
305

skepticism,” which influences “many jurisdictions” to “curtail the practice”).
See, e.g., New Empath Units Will Offer Expanded Access to Emergency Mental Health
Care, M HEALTH FAIRVIEW (Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.mhealth.org/blog/2020/nov2020/new-empath-units-will-offer-expanded-access-to-emergency-mental-health-care?
[https://perma.cc/AH8K-5JWP] (“Nationally, 1 in 8 emergency room visits involve mental
health or substance use conditions.”).
Wexler, supra note 56, at 32. See id. for general information surrounding Therapeutic
Jurisprudence.
See Interview with Dr. Flores, supra note 49; Lurigio et al., supra note 227, at 46 (noting
that those with mental illness “fall into the lap of the criminal justice system because of the
dearth of mental health treatment and other community services”).
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an aspect of community support severely lacking is the availability of
affordable housing for individuals with severe mental illness. 309 There would
be less need for a protection like the insanity defense if people with severe
mental illness had the ability to get basic mental health care. However, the
current health care system vilifies mental illness; insurance companies do
not always pay for mental health problems, and reimbursement rates are
different for mental health versus physical ailments. 310
Community support must exist symbiotically with the criminal justice
system and the health care system in order to provide the requisite support
for those individuals leaving the prison system. 311 Proper access to
community support can change how a mentally ill individual is able to
function in society. 312 In fact, interruption of services can actually cause a
reversal of previously obtained benefits for those with mental illness. 313
Community care must be prevalent to the degree that care for each
individual can be catered to their unique situation. 314 The creation of
community care clinics specializing in free or lower-cost mental health
services would provide the requisite and available assistance to those that
need it. Allowing private insurance companies to continue to deny or make
mental health treatment unobtainable must be avoided at all costs.
Successful community support for those with chronic and severe
mental illness involves including practical community-oriented help such as
support for basic needs, along with a range of services. 315 The integral
component of community support is structure for those with mental
illness. 316 Improving the community support for the mentally ill can improve
the life satisfaction for this population. 317 Currently, the insanity defense is
treated differently from other defenses since the individual is viewed as still
responsible. 318 With continued education, community assistance, and
Lurigio et al., supra note 227, at 46 (“Lack of affordable housing compounds the problems
of people with [serious mental illness] and interferes with the provision of mental health
treatment.”).
Interview with Dr. Stinson, supra note 53. Health care issues may vary by jurisdiction. See

309

310

id.
Lurigio et al., supra note 227, at 47.
Frank Baker, David Jodrey, James Intagliata & Harry Straus, Community Support Services
and Functioning of the Seriously Mentally Ill, 29 CMTY. MENTAL HEALTH J. 321, 329 (1993)
(“[R]eceipt of needed community support services . . . is significantly related to maintenance
of functioning . . . .”).
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312

313
314

Id.
Id. at 330 (“[I]t was not the absolute amount of such support that was found to be associated

with improvement in functioning, but rather the degree to which clients rated their level of
available support as adequate to their own particular needs.”).
See Rosenfield, supra note 19, at 301.
Id. at 310.
See id. at 301.
Interview with Dr. Stinson, supra note 53. Dr. Stinson described his experiences where
individuals held NGRI are then treated as if they are responsible for the offense, regardless
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availability of a standardized insanity defense, the insanity defense itself will
hopefully provide the support for this vulnerable population.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It is not enough that mental health be taken into account during trial
and sentencing: if we are to help those with mental illness, a defense must
exist where those suffering from serious mental conditions can get help
instead of receiving the additional stigma of a criminal sentence.
Rehabilitation is effective at restoring mentally ill individuals to reason and
should be used when possible. 319
The solution proposed in this Note involves a deeper examination into
the psychology of personality disorder to determine what must be excluded
from the defense and what ultimately must be included. From that point,
this Note argues that the comparison of necessary insanity test components
with personality disorders outlines the basic principles, which should be
prevalent in every insanity test, no matter the jurisdiction. This Note also
contends that an influx of education, both publicly and within the legal field,
is necessary to reduce stigma and misconceptions regarding mental illness
and the insanity defense. Finally, this Note argues that increased community
support and availability of treatment will result in a reduced need to use
NGRI defenses at all and will benefit the whole community.

of their successful use of the defense. Id. These NGRI acquitees can become political
hostages, where judges have decided that on their watch, the individual will never be free. Id.
Bard, supra note 22, at 70. “Rehabilitation takes on particular significance in the case of
the mentally ill, because advances in medications and therapy have proven highly effective
in restoring the mentally ill’s capacity for reason and thus steering them away from criminal
behavior.” Id. at 72.
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